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You'd better start swimming or you'll sink like a stone.
-Bob Dylan
I. Introduction
In the most recent of three landmark antitrust cases against
software giant Microsoft, United States v. Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft
III"),1 Microsoft argued that the nature of its "new economy"
industry mandated that courts adopt a different view of the
monopolization charges the company faced.2 The approach Microsoft
advocated attempted to inject a sensitivity to the needs of dynamic
industries that operate in a different competitive landscape than the
kinds of brick-and-mortar markets the law has been developed over
time to serve.3 The court refused to consider the proposed paradigm
shift and instead relied on traditional, old economy antitrust
principles. In doing so, the court passed up an opportunity to usher
existing antitrust law into the twentieth century, and failed to protect
the needs of producers and consumers in the new millennium.
When a court analyzes a Sherman Act monopolization charge4 it
looks at a company's market power horizontally across a group of
providers in a single "relevant product market."5 The relevant
product market has traditionally been defined by identifying products
that are "reasonably interchangeable [with defendant's product] by
consumers."6 Microsoft argued that competition in the software
1. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Microsoft
appealed antitrust claims including monopolization, attempted monopolization, and tying,
with respect to its Windows operating system and Internet Explorer internet browser
software.
2. Id. at 49-51 (arguing that the rapid evolutionary nature of the software and
network technology market is inherently different than traditional product markets,
requiring a modified analysis of the monopolization claim).
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2000). The Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints
on trade, including combinations (horizontal or vertical agreements such as price fixing or
market division), and monopolization. The later adopted Clayton Act, which adds several
substantive prohibitions, as well as remedial provisions, is discussed infra.
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416, 422-32 (2d Cir.
1945) (engaging in an analysis of the market in which Alcoa operated for purposes of
determining monopolization liability). While the term "relevant product market" was not
adopted by courts until later (see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 585 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)), Alcoa introduced the conceptual framework.
6. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. ("du Pont"), 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956).
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industry is unique, demanding a different approach to several aspects
of monopolization analysis. 7 The argument posits that in quickly
evolving markets, firms compete "for the field," vying for the next
innovative idea that will supplant the previous technology and
become the new industry standard.8 Microsoft further argued that the
existence of "network effects" of many software and technology
products provides a greater benefit to the public when provided by a
single dominant firm's solution.9 It asserted that network products
provide far greater value to consumers (in the form of efficiency and
predictability) when they promote interoperability.' °
The court rejected these arguments,' and this article explores the
merits of their consideration in analyzing monopolization claims.
There are several significant reasons that the suggested change was,
and is, worthy of consideration. First, the court's outright rejection of
Microsoft's sophisticated analytical framework rooted in economic
theory is an anomaly, taken in light of over a century of active judicial
evolution of antitrust standards and principles." Second, the court
chose to disregard Microsoft's claims that the public would be
adversely impacted if courts did not recognize the increasing
importance of so-called "network effects" that characterize much of
the current field of high technology products and services. 3 Finally,
the court's decision ignores the fact that analysis of antitrust problems
in new economy markets under the traditional framework will
7. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 50, 51 (arguing that network effects of operating system
software mitigate the harm of Microsoft's monopoly position, and that the rapid change in
the software industry requires direct proof of market power, rather than a presumption
based on market share).
8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 587 (2002)
("Competition in markets with substantial network effects is usually for the dominant
market position - i.e., competition is 'for the field' rather than 'within the field."').
9. Microsoft I1, 253 F.3d at 49-50.
10. Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis,
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 621 (1999) (describing the
benefit of "compatibility and interoperability" underlying this particular network effect in
software markets as its potential to create a 'positive feedback loop"').
11. Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 57 (stating that "Microsoft cites no case, nor are we
aware of one, requiring direct evidence to show monopoly power in any market").
12. Id.
13. Id. at 50 (asserting that "[w]hether or not Microsoft's characterization of the
[network effects in the] operating system market is correct does not appreciably alter our
mission in assessing the alleged antitrust violations in the present case").
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provide limited utility and tend to render many such antitrust
decisions and remedies obsolete long before they are issued. 4
While recognizing the challenges that implementing these
proposed changes would present the courts,'5 this article presents a
basic framework by which they could be implemented. The
accommodations suggested herein are not intended as a definitive
solution. Rather, they illustrate the potential for enhancing the power
of the antitrust laws by integrating this new body of doctrine with
existing principles. First, this article offers a modified definition of the
relevant product market. Second, it proposes an updated analysis of a
firm's power in an innovative market. Finally, the article addresses
ways to integrate innovation and network effects concepts into
analyses of monopolization conduct. Antitrust laws can more
adequately serve the needs of both the innovative industry players
and the consumers who rely on the products they produce through
recognition and integration of these principles at all three phases of a
monopolization prosecution. 6
II. Background
A. Sherman Act: Market Power and Monopolization Conduct
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it a felony to "monopolize
any part of trade or commerce.', 17 Since the inception of the Act,
courts have interpreted this language to require two elements: power
in the relevant market," and a conduct element that requires some
type of criminal, illegal, or otherwise illicit behavior designed to
14. Id. at 49 (refusing to deviate from established analysis despite acknowledging that
"just over six years have passed since Microsoft engaged in the first conduct plaintiffs
allege to be anticompetitive. As the record in this case indicates, six years seems like an
eternity in the computer industry. By the time a court can assess liability, firms, products,
and the marketplace are likely to have changed dramatically."). Indeed, during the six
years between Microsoft's conduct and the judgment, the nature of the competition in the
market (including the prominence of middleware competitors Java and Netscape), had
changed dramatically. A firm harmed by anticompetitive behavior in an innovative market
may have missed its opportunity in that market, and cannot be made whole by injunctive
relief or money damages.
15. See Challenges to Meet and Pitfalls to Avoid, infra Section IV.D.
16. See Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROC. 192, 193 (2000) (arguing just prior to the Microsoft III
decision that "traditional tests for monopoly power" fail to adequately address the rapid
change of market structure and power in the software industry).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
18. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. ("du Pont"), 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956) (defining market power as "the power to control prices or exclude competition").
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achieve or maintain monopoly power.'9 It is well established that
market power, or the ability to control pricing above the competitive
level by regulating output in the market for a particular product or
service,20 "ordinarily may be inferred from [a firm's] predominant
share of the market."2' Modern plaintiffs can conclusively establish
the market power element of their claims indirectly by showing that
the defendant holds at least an 80 percent market share in the
relevant market.
Courts have routinely relied on economic theory to inform their
active evolution of standards for application of the antitrust laws,23
and legal scholarship has consistently pushed for adoption of more
sophisticated economic analysis. In pursuit of its goal to benefit the
public, it has been the practice of the judiciary to look to economics
to determine the most appropriate targets for liability and the most
effective remedies.25 In this way, courts are able to refine their
19. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
20. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.
1986).
21. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
22. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992); see
also du Pont, 351 U.S. at 379-80 (finding that du Pont was "dominating" the market with
75% market share).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (identifying market power and monopolization conduct elements, and engaging in
market definition to determine market power, forever changing monopolization law); see
also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (holding that
leverage from market power in one product to effect sales in a related product can be
monopolization conduct); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985) (holding that individually disadvantageous behavior in the economic short run
was likely to constitute monopolization conduct); Cont'l T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (holding that vertical, non-price restraints should not be illegal per se under
section 1 of the Sherman Act because the adverse effects of intrabrand competition
promoted interbrand competition); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 590 (1986) (analyzing conduct based on its impact on the market in the "short
run," or the period over which competitors cannot effect a change in output to respond to
a market shift in demand).
24. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Barry D. Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as
Contractual Integration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost
Economics, and Organization Theory, 32 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1013 (1983) (arguing that
transaction cost economics and decision/organization theory can provide valuable
frameworks to inform policy decision regarding the implementation of the Antitrust laws).
25. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975) (arguing for a
detailed economic analysis of why challenged conduct does not tend to threaten the
operation of markets in evaluation of monopolization claims).
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approach to provide fine grained analysis of complex economic
26systems.
In that spirit, courts have adapted standards to impute liability
and to provide remedies consistent with the tenets of prominent
economic theories.27 In the most recent term, the United States
Supreme Court overturned a ninety-six year old per se prohibition on
vertical minimum price fixing in favor of analyzing such restraints
under the rule of reason.28 The Court noted that vertical price
restraints reduced intrabrand competition, but promoted interbrand
competition in the same way that vertical non-price restrictions did.29
The Court adopted analysis from legal and economic scholarship
tending to show that such a rule can decrease free-riding, create high-
price, high-service brands, and provide consumers with reliable
information about high quality options.3" Courts continue to adopt
increasingly astute and informed formulations of tests, and to artfully
devise remedies when liability is found.3' It seems anachronistic that
the Microsoft III court would refuse to at least attempt a detailed
review of the merits of an argument that hinges on a discrete
economic concept directly applicable to the market in question.32
26. Id. But see Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic
Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (criticizing
the "nip-and-tuck" approach, and arguing that the Antitrust laws are better suited to being
applied as a blunt instrument, the authors introduce their article with the premise that
"Antitrust law is a hammer, not a scalpel").
27. Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and
Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 308 (2005) (noting that "[m]odern antitrust
doctrine's incorporation of economics is manifest and ... today the debate is not whether
economic theory shapes antitrust doctrine, but rather which variant of economic theory is
in favor").
28. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007)
(overturning Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911) despite
a strong stare decisis challenge, in light of the advanced economic analysis of the potential
procompetetive effects of such restrictions).
29. Id. at 2715 (citing Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997)).
30. Id. at 2715-16 (citing Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic
Perspective, 172-73 (2d ed. 2001) (1976); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty,
Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347-49
(1984)).
31. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 25; see also, Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710 (holding
vertical minimum price restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason because of
their procompetetive potential to stimulate interbrand competition through intrabrand
restrictions by creating a market for high-price, high-service options while decreasing free-
riding).
32. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001) (asserting that "[t]he issue is particularly
complex because, in network industries characterized by rapid innovation, both forces
B. Competition for the Field: The Essence of the Argument
In defining a firm's market power, it necessarily follows that the
fewer competitors the court identifies in the relevant market, the
greater the defendant firm's market share will be.3 Since a large
market share creates a presumption of market power, defendant firms
generally seek to expand the field that the court considers to be its
competitors."4  Typically, defendants argue that products not
previously considered by courts to be competitors could qualify as
effective substitutes for defendants product.35
In the Microsoft III case, Microsoft also argued that the rapid
pace of innovation demanded a completely different understanding of
the nature of competition in the software market, and therefore a
different understanding of its landscape of competitors.36 Rather than
competing for a share of the market for an existing product, Microsoft
argued that innovators compete to release the next innovative
product 7 By creating an entirely new product that renders a current
product obsolete, an innovator has the opportunity to capture nearly
all of the old product's users, and achieve a significant market share
of the new product while the usership of the old product plummets.
The new product is not a substitute for the old product, but rather a
replacement for it.
According to this view competition takes place "for the field"
rather than in it.38 Competition for the field is fierce, and fast paced.39
may be operating and can be difficult to isolate"). In recommending that courts should
engage in such an inquiry, the author does not suggested that such an enterprise would be
without its challenges.
33. Simple arithmetic shows that if one firm's volume of business remains
numerically constant, its proportional share of the market will change as the definition of
what constitutes the entire market expands or contracts. For example, if defendant and
two other firms each have a sales volume of 1, defendant's market share would be 33
percent if all firms are considered, or 50 percent if only one of the two competitors is
included. As a result, a monopolization defendant argues for a broader definition of the
relevant market to decrease its own share of the total, thereby limiting the presumption of
market power.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416, 423 (2d
Cir. 1945) (arguing that providers of recycled, or "secondary" ingot were competitors in
the general aluminum market).
35. Id. (dismissing Alcoa's argument secondary ingot was a valid substitute for virgin
because secondary was of lesser quality, and manufacturers of many products, such as wire
and aviation parts, insisted on using virgin).
36. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
37. Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 623 (noting, inter alia, that "[i]nnovation is an
important dimension of competition in these markets").
38. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 587 ("[C]ompetition is 'for the field' rather
than 'within the field.' The early leader, offering the largest network benefits, will
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It requires that firms think several product cycles ahead to ensure
that they are staying on the forefront of innovation and to anticipate
the rapid change in consumer demand that is fomented by advances
in related technologies.4" As a pointed example, early pioneers in e-
commerce, such as Amazon.com, Netflix, and iTunes, were able to
create significant market shares by anticipating the growth in online
shopping enabled by advances in broadband internet service and the
demand for so-called "long tail" content that proliferation of
broadband networks made possible."41
III. Analysis
A. Innovation: The Case for Change
It has been sixty-five years since Joseph Schumpeter introduced
his theory of "creative destruction," wherein innovation stimulates
long term economic growth by "revolutioniz[ing] economic structure
from within., 42 Despite compelling economic and legal scholarship on
the Schumpeterian philosophy and its application to antitrust
analysis, courts have yet to embrace and apply this theory in their
Sherman Act jurisprudence.43 The unique landscape that is the rapidly
evolving technology market is not well served by rigid, old-economy
approaches to antitrust analysis because it assumes that innovation
cannot effect competition in the short run." As a result, the
consuming public-the group the antitrust laws are designed to
successfully attract additional consumers and have good chances of dominating the
market.").
39. See generally MICHEL ROBERT, PRODUCT INNOVATION STRATEGY PURE &
SIMPLE: How WINNING COMPANIES OUTPACE THEIR COMPETITORS (McGraw Hill, Inc.
1995).
40. Id.
41. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE 6-13 (2006) (arguing that the traditional "80/20" rule, which
dictates that 80 percent of sales are made on 20 percent of available products does not
apply where consumers have access to all products and "shelf space" is not an issue, as in
the online retail industry. Instead, significant profits can be made by business that
innovates ways to capture niche markets, making low volume sales on each of the massive
collection of less popular products that represent the "long tail" of the products/sales
demand curve).
42. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86
(Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1976) (1942).
43. See, e.g., Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32. See also Schmalensee, supra note 16,
at 193 (arguing that "traditional tests for monopoly power" fail to adequately address the
rapid change of market structure and power in the software industry).
44. Schmalensee, supra note 16, at 193.
protect-may be deprived of the full benefit that such a market has to
offer.45
If Schumpeter's ideas were highly applicable to the economy he
knew, they are even more apropos today. 6 In the past decade, the
nature of innovation has changed dramatically. Schumpeter could
not have imagined the pace, impact, and grass roots nature of modern
innovation that has enabled an eighteen year old college freshman to
revolutionize network computing by developing peer-to-peer file
sharing software in his spare time;4 ' a pair of twenty-three year old
graduate students to instantly change the way the world retrieved
information by indexing the Internet more effectively;4 9 a twenty-one
year old software developer exploring a "hobby" to change the
operating system market and open source movement by releasing
Linux;0 and a thirty-one year old M.I.T. Ph.D. dropout to publish the
GNU Manifesto, giving birth to the open source software movement,
responsible for untold innovation and economic value.5 Given that
the pace of innovation has increased exponentially and that
revolutionary ideas can come from unlikely places and change the
world almost overnight, it is a hyperbolic oversimplification to assert
that a technology firm's long term market power is wholly unrelated
to nascent, incipient, or even unanticipated innovation. 2
45. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 634-45.
46. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32, at 11 ("Though he died decades before the
advent of personal computing, Schumpeter saw such rivalry as 'the essential fact about
capitalism"') (quoting SCHUMPETER, supra note 42, at 83).
47. See, e.g., Moore's Law - Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore'slaw
(exemplary of an axiomatic principle in the technology industry that with each individual
technological advance, the potential for further advancement doubles, and manufacturing
approaches "minimum cost").
48. Timothy James Ryan, Note, Infringement. conm: RIAA v. Napster and the War
Against Online Music Piracy, 44 ARIz. L. REV. 495, 497 (2002) (noting that Fanning
"beg[an] a revolution that would pit music aficionados against the very establishment that
gave them their beloved artform in the first place"); See also Shawn Fanning - Biography,
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiShawn-Fanning
49. Bryan H. Choi, Note, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 393, 395
n.13 (citing Google - Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google#History).
50. See generally Douglas A. Hass, A Gentlemen's Agreement Assessing the Gnu
General Public License and Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213
(2007); See also Linus Torvalds - Biography, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/LinusTorvalds.
51. See generally Hass, supra note 50. See also Richard Stallman - Biography,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stallman.
52. Shelanski & Shidak, supra note 32, at 11 (noting that in Schumpterian markets "a
firm's acquisition or possession of market power may be fleeting").
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Courts continue to look at markets for technology products as
simply a snapshot in time, where firms compete for a share of the
sales of an existing solution. By doing so they fail to recognize the
dramatic power that innovators have in these markets over the course
of time.53 As illustrated in previous examples, Schumpeterian
revolutions can take place quickly, and paradigms can shift almost
overnight.54 While the law traditionally insists on identifying market
competitors by their ability to act as effective substitutes,55 it seems
unrealistic not to acknowledge a factor that significantly influences
technology firms' own competitive analyses: that nascent threats,
though immediately impotent, may potentially develop into
substitutes for their own products over the short run.56
B. Institutional Roles: Congress has Charged the Courts with
Implementing Standards
The substantive prohibition on monopolization established in
section two of the Sherman Act (enacted in 1890 and never amended)
reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty ......
This broadly crafted prohibition necessarily fails to address the
myriad nuanced situations to which it was intended to and now
applies. 8 In recognition of the vast and dynamic arena that makes up
the American economy, Congress implicitly acknowledged their
inability to implement a code that effectively addressed all behaviors
that they intended to proscribe. 9 To that end, it charged the courts
53. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 617.
54. Shelanski & Shidak, supra note 32, at 15 (describing the process as "a series of
companies leapfrogging each other").
55. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Numours & Co. ("du Pont,"), 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956).
56. See ROBERT, supra note 39.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
58. See KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW (Vol. I 1980) (noting that the history
of the act shows that Congress intended the broad language of the act to provide the
courts with leeway to address the wide variety of anticompetitive conduct with which they
might be presented with).
59. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) (announcing the rule
of reason standard applicable to violations of section 1 of the Sherman act, and noting that
that by "not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows
that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common
law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute,
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with developing judicial standards by which to implement the
fundamental goals of the antitrust laws. 60 The Supreme Court recently
reiterated its commitment to developing the common law of Sherman
Act jurisprudence, stating that "[f]rom the beginning the Court has
treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute., 6' "Just as the
common law adapts to modern understanding and greater
experience," the Court noted, "so too does the Sherman Act's
prohibition on 'restraints of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of
present economic conditions."'62 Seen in that light, the court's refusal
to consider a body of doctrine applicable to a new paradigm of
economics and competition on institutional roles grounds is no more
than a failure to act in accordance with the very authority it claimed
authorized inaction.63
C. Network Effects: The Public Benefits from Certain Kinds of
Monopolies
One of the primary concepts underlying a discussion of the
difference between many old economy products and a wide variety of
new economy markets is the notion of the "network effect." 6 The
network effect is a characteristic of a product by which its value to the
consumer is defined or enhanced by virtue of other consumers
adopting the same product.65 The identifying characteristic of a
product with network effects is its ability to connect one consumer, or
"user," to other users of the same product.66 A classic example of the
network effect is the telephone and accompanying infrastructure: but
was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether, in a given
case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute
provided").
60. KINTNER, supra note 58 at 165, 239. In arguing that Congress "intended to
provide only the general guiding principle for competitive activity and to leave for the
courts the often difficult task of determining the legality of particular conduct on a case-
by-case basis," the author quotes Senator Sherman's floor speech in which the bill's
sponsor stated that "it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between
lawful and unlawful .... [It] must be left to the courts to determine in each particular
case."
61. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
62. Id.
63. David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729, 729 (2001) (claiming that the history of the Sherman Act
"suggests that Congress failed to resolve conflicts among economic interests affected by
the antitrust laws, leaving such a resolution to the courts").
64. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 10.
65. Id. at 620 (citing Carl Shapiro, Hal R. Varian, Information Rules 13 (Harvard
Business School Press 1998)).
66. Id.
20071
190 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [30:1
for the ability to call other users who also purchased telephones and
paid for access to the telephone system (the network), any individual
user's purchase of a telephone would be entirely useless.67
Consequently, the utility of products characterized by network
effects increases exponentially with their rate or adoption.'
Furthermore, competing and incompatible systems which implement
the same type of network undermine the ability of any of the products
to achieve their peak performance.69 So long as the usership is divided
amongst the competing platforms, no single user will achieve the
benefit that would be possible to that user (and all users) were they
all to adopt a single platform.7 ° In such cases, the technology itself
would be unlikely to penetrate and be adopted at all, given that the
experience most users would have would be a less than compelling
endorsement of the technology.71 Hypothetically, simultaneous
development of several incompatible phone systems in the early
stages of telecommunications technology innovation could have
stifled the creation of any single phone system. By extension, in an
analogous scenario the Internet, which underlies a significant portion
of economic activity today (from consumer retail activity, to
international currency market synchronization, to business-to-
business data integration), may never have developed if multiple
competing frameworks for networked computing had developed,
thereby fragmenting the market and isolating the usership of each.72
Once a unitary system has been deployed, the public is primed to
take part in the evolution of that technology by building the network
through using it, the so-called "network externality."73 By allowing
67. The phone would still "work" in the sense that the basic features of the
technology would still function as expected. However, the only task a user would be able
to accomplish would be to connect to the switchboard and talk to the operator. Without
the addition of another user of the system to connect to, the phone has no real purpose,
and without a wide variety of users to connect to, its utility is extremely limited. The true
value of the phone as a technological solution is only realized by the expansion of the
network itself.




72. Interestingly, in that scenario, Microsoft would likely never have been in a
position to find itself embroiled in this litigation matter. Microsoft's contributions to the
technology landscape have undoubtedly brought immeasurable benefit to the consuming
public, both directly and by way of patronizing other businesses whose products, services,
and operations are enhanced by Microsoft's innovations.
73. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32, at 7-8 ("Network externalities are benefits to
society that accrue as the size of a network grows.").
the public to utilize standardized products and services, a singular
"network" is created. 4 When new network innovations prove
superior to previous network solutions, an entire user base can
upgrade over a short period of time, making the transition together.
By allowing the unitary network to form in the first place, the
integrity of the network itself is reinforced through the evolution of
the platform upon which it is deployed.75
In such markets, the public derives a clear benefit from the
establishment of unitary platforms and protocols, in the form of the
network externality. 6 Some industries have successfully adopted
standards organizations that take on the onerous task of
synchronizing the efforts of multiple players in the field to ensure that
interoperability is developed or maintained.7 Such shared standards,
however, are necessarily voluntary, and allow any individual firm to
deviate from the established norms should they choose to do so. 8 In a
pointed example, both the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
(two different independent standards organizations) have published
specifications for SQL (the "structured query language" used to
interact with data in a database). 9 Each individual database software
product chooses to implement one standard or the other, and most
include their own modifications, customizations, and extensions.'
Furthermore, standards bodies are only likely to formalize standards
where a proprietary solution does not already exist." Finally, efforts
to engage in standards setting amongst competing proprietary
solutions providers could have antitrust implications in and of
themselves.82
74. Id.
75. Id. (calling this phenomenon "technological path dependence").
76. Id. at 27 (noting that "[t]he consumer benefits from bundling and interoperability
can be substantial").
77. For example, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) oversees the
creation and promulgation of guidelines and consensus standards for a huge variety of
business sectors. See About ANSI, Overview, http://ansi.org/about.ansi/overview
/overview.aspx.
78. Id.
79. See Wikipedia - SQL, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL (last visited Aug. 23,
2007).
80. Id.
81. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32, at 87.
82. Id. at 88. ("A substantial body of law exists on the question of whether standard
setting among horizontal competitors enhances efficiency and benefits consumer welfare
or instead facilitates collusion or the exclusion of entrants.").
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In many cases (particularly when such platforms may be
transitory, and replaced by a subsequent innovation) the more
efficient solution is to let a single provider define its own protocol and
garner usership based solely on the superiority of its technology.'
While even duplicative and competing standards can benefit the
public,' a single standard would be more efficient and effective in
establishing interoperability. Since the ultimate aim of the antitrust
laws is to benefit the consuming public, it would be remiss to ignore
the fact that such market structures get better products to the public
quickly and cheaply, and continue to do so over time.85
The sine qua non of such markets is investment in research and
development." Competitors in such markets do not generally
concentrate on developing a product to compete with the current
standard. 7 Instead, they are forward looking, and rely on innovation
to develop a product or platform that can supplant the current market
leader because of its superiority.' Immediately upon the launch of
such a product (and in anticipation of its own rapid replacement by
more new technology), the provider company must charge a premium
to recoup its investment.89 Such a price is not artificially high, but a
83. In many cases in which industry standardization efforts have taken the place of
"standardized" monopoly providers, competing standards have sprung up, leading to the
acerbic axiom often used among technologists that "the great thing about standards is that
there are so many to choose from." See, e.g., Wayne Hodgins, The Great Thing About
Standards Is..., Off Course-On Target (Oct. 21, 2006),
http://waynehodgins.typepad.com/ontarget/2006/10/thegreat-thing.html
84. Id. (arguing that having standards is better than having none, but that having
more than a single standard leads to confusion).
85. See Shelanski & Sidak, supr'a note 32, at 10 (arguing for Professor Arrow's
admonishment that "a rule of penalizing market successes that are not the result of
anticompetitive practices will, among other consequences, have the effect of taxing
technological improvements and is unlikely to improve welfare in the long run.") (citing
Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow, attached to Memorandum of the United States of
America in Support of Motion to Enter Final Judgment and in Opposition to the Positions
of I.D.E. Corporation and Amici, United States v. Microsoft Corp, Civil Action No. 94-
1564, 5-6 (D DC filed Jan. 18, 1995)).
86. Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 620, (pointing out that "markets subject to
large network effects and incompatible products may tend towards oligopoly or
monopoly").
87. Id. at 622 (noting that "[m]onopoly power can be and often is achieved through a
natural economic process of one firm exhibiting superior skill or luck to innovate faster or
achieve lower costs than its competitors").
88. Id. at 623 (discussing how exclusionary conduct has the potential to shift
innovation by making it "more difficult for competitors to offer new and superior
programs and technologies" with which to displace existing dominant technologies).
89. Shelanski & Shidak, supra note 32, at 5. ("Winners enjoy a period of dominance,
during which they receive above-cost prices that include the returns necessary to induce
natural means of dividing fixed costs incrementally over unit sales.
Furthermore, the monopoly platform provider is often unable to
sustain such an inflated pricel If the platform lasts long enough,
other players may be able to provide cheaper alternatives, eroding
the now bloated price point. If instead another provider introduces a
replacement technology, the cycle begins again.91 When courts view
"inflated" prices that recoup the investment in innovation as abuses
of monopoly power, they ignore the reality of the economics of many
markets.9
The accommodations suggested herein are not intended to
discount the potential for abuse of monopoly power, even in
innovative markets for networked products.93 Allowances for the
unique needs of fast paced, innovative markets for products with
network effects may exacerbate their tendency to become
oligopolistic, which in turn may increase the likelihood for abuse of
entrenched positions.9' A provider in the type of market described
above may be tempted to turn its focus away from innovation and
towards entrenchment. 9 This risk directly challenges the very public
benefit derived from allowing firms to act to foster interoperability-
ensuring public access to the enhanced network benefit from the most
recent innovations in the market. In that case, behavior designed to
prevent the entry of new innovations that could displace the current
monopolist is exactly the type of conduct that the antitrust laws,
should seek to curtail, through the application of the principles
underlying these markets.' Section IV, infra, a proposal for enforcing
the antitrust laws outlines in a way that addresses the unique benefits
risky investment in product innovation, but are subject to being supplanted by rivals in a
later innovation cycle.").
90. Id. The "period" of dominance will be limited to the period over which a
competitor could ramp up an effort to create a competing product and enter the market.
91. Id.
92. Id. (competitors in such markets "achieve market dominance, but dominance that
is continually challenged and subject to displacement by subsequent innovations").
93. Indeed, it is likely that that even under the suggested analysis, Microsoft would
not have escaped liability, because their market power and conduct would both satisfy the
elements analytical framework proposed herein.
94. Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 620.
95. Id. at 623.
96. ("By controlling compatibility and interoperability of rivals' programs, and by
implementing exclusive relationships that deny rivals' access to certain technologies, it is
more difficult for competitors to offer new and superior programs and technologies.
Facing less innovation competition, a firm like Microsoft might be able to slow its own
innovative efforts and channel innovations in a way that it controls, thereby entrenching
its monopoly power in the future").
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and dangers present in new economy industries and markets
characterized by network effects.
D. The Times They Are A-Changin': Innovative Markets Are Not
Protected Without Recognition of Their Unique Needs
In essence, the Microsoft III decision neglected to address the
fact that, practically speaking, courts applying traditional tests will not
be able to accurately assess and remedy genuinely anti-competitive
behavior in contemporary markets. This is because in innovative
product markets, exclusionary behavior is only effective until the next
innovation supplants the importance of the relevant product 7
Furthermore, since the Clayton Act authorizes private parties to sue
under the antitrust laws and recover treble damages plus attorneys'
fees,' justice requires that the substantive prohibitions of the Act
must closely track an analyses of real harms and benefits inside the
markets to which they are applied.99
Market power is more easily maintained when there are
significant barriers to entry."° Empirically, barriers are more likely to
be found when a strong firm maintains a dominant share of a product
market.' °1 However, in markets characterized by competition for the
field, the primary barrier to entry is capacity for innovation. Current
market share, without more, is not a valid measure of innovative
capacity. The barriers that prevent a firm from entering a market to
compete directly with a current product are created by the network
effects themselves.' 2 If competition in a market is for the field, a
dominant firm's raising of prices above a competitive level have no
direct bearing on a competitive firm's ability to create new products
that render the dominant firm's product obsolete. It is other market
created barriers, however, that affect a competitor's ability to break
into the market.03 It is true that a dominant firm may capture a large
percentage of sales in a product market, inhibiting direct competitors
from generating revenues that underwrite research activities out of
operating profits. Product revenue is not the only source of research
97. See Schmalensee, supra note 16.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing in pertinent part that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
99. See Schmalensee, supra note 16.
100. Salop & Romaine, supra note 10, at 621.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 620.
103. Id. at 621.
funding, and non-competitors may also engage in innovations that
ultimately disrupt existing product markets.
Present entrenchment, on the other hand, can provide benefits to
consumers in the short term." Such entrenchment should not be
given the same weight as activities that tend to prevent competitive
firms from innovating new solutions in the same industry. For
example, behaviors such as filing overly broad patents, restrictive
licensing agreements, product leverage, and strategic mergers and
acquisitions, can be used to create barriers to entry and harness
control of a market for innovation over time. 5 Such activity can take
place parallel to, and independent of, competition in the present
product market' °6 It can actively stifle sequential competition for the
relevant field."°  Without recognizing the economic principles
underlying competition in these markets, courts are deprived of a
specialized set of tools with which to accurately determine liability
and craft appropriate remedies to redress truly anticompetitive
behavior.' 8
IV. Proposal: Implementing a New Framework for Analyzing
Monopolization Charges in Innovative Product Markets
A. Defining the Relevant Innovative Product Market
In Microsoft III, the court refused to recognize the Java platform
and the Netscape internet browser as competitive products in the
relevant product market because they were not yet capable of being
substituted by consumers as an alternative for a computer operating
system, such as Windows. 19 The first step toward solving this problem
is for courts to acknowledge the rapid changes made in the
technology market." Court's need not "make up" potential entrants
104. Id.
105. Id. at 622.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32, at 27 (arguing that a "remedy that prevents
bundling because of its perceived effects on competitors would also eliminate its benefits
for consumers").
109. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that
"consumers could not now abandon their operating systems and switch to middleware in
response to a sustained price for Windows above the competitive level").
110. In fact, the Internet (and internet browsers, by extension) has become a practical
competitor as an application deployment platform. For example, webmail providers, such
as Hotmail and Gmail, have overtaken desktop email clients, such as Microsoft Outlook
or Lotus Notes, and the trend is expected to continue, at least for this fundamental
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or be prescient as to the next innovation."' Rather, they can look at
existing firms that have the potential to provide new alternatives to
defendant's product, as well as firms known to be investing in
developments in the industry (even if none are yet viable substitutes),
and consider them as potential competitors for the field. In doing so
courts can more accurately approximate the market structure as
perceived by the players in that market, and thereby conform their
legal analysis more closely to the actual operations of the markets.
This simple change in focus on what form the relevant
competition takes informs a change in the analysis of who the
competitors are. Courts can then avoid the morass of attempting to
divine innovative possibilities where the technology innovators
themselves have not yet realized those possibilities. Only identifiable
potential need be considered, and innovation share can be evaluated
based on an analysis of the competing firms' potential for growth and
eventual Schumpeterian market transformation. By establishing that
a firm has a dominant ability to provide innovative solutions in the
field (or to prevent others from providing them), courts can
determine a firm's market power in the innovative product market.
B. Establishing Power in the Relevant Innovative Product Market
Again, a court's recognition that the relevant market is the entire
field, rather than a particular product, underlies the analysis of how
market power is established. Rather than looking at a firm's ability to
control price or output of a single product, the courts can look at the
ability to control price or output of innovation in the field. While
Microsoft's assertion that direct evidence of market power should be
required may be misguided, it might be possible for the courts to
create an appropriate surrogate for market power based on a firm's
innovation potential. For example, courts could look at a firm's
history of providing the innovative replacement for a previous
product in a particular product or service space. If it can be shown
that a particular company holds 80 percent or more of the innovations
in a field, and is only rarely supplanted from its dominant position,
substantial "innovation share" is shown, and market power could be
inferred.
personal computing activity. See THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., E-MAIL CLIENT MARKET,
2006-2010, (follow "Email Clients" link).
111. Indeed, the Court found that "Microsoft feared [Netscape and Java] because they
were well positioned to serve as platforms for 'network-centric applications that run in
association with Web pages."' Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 32, at 66-67 (quoting United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
In situations in which this innovation share is not large enough,
or definite enough to afford a presumption of market power, courts
can look to direct evidence to do so, as they have always done. In the
context of innovative markets, this type of control may be found in
the form of disproportionate investment in research and development
or marketing, influential positions in industry organizations or
standards bodies, a history of acquisition of innovative technologies,
or employment of a large share of an industry's leading research and
development personnel. Indeed, contrary to Microsoft's assertion in
Microsoft III, large market share could be a strong indicator of ability
to control innovation through direct influence over a significant
portion of the consumer base in a particular product space. Any of
these elements could support a finding that the firm in question has
significant power in the market to control the nature and pace of
innovation without fear of being supplanted by another firm
competing for the field.
C. Analyzing Monopolization Conduct of Influential Firms in Innovative
Product Markets
Because the antitrust laws are intended to protect competition
and not competitors, when the competition in question is for the field
only conduct that is directed at suppressing competition for the field
should be considered by courts."' The court in Microsoft III
effectively implemented this standard by holding that despite not
being included in the relevant product market, Microsoft's conduct
harmed Java and Netscape by inhibiting their ability to eventually
become effective substitutes. "3 Considering conduct which effects
firms excluded from the relevant product market analysis seems
logically inconsistent (as Microsoft argued) unless one adopts the
principle that competition is taking place for the field, rather than in
it. While failing to name it as such, the rule the court announced
implicitly adopted the view that behavior hampering Schumpeterian
innovation in the field constituted monopolization conduct.
In evaluating conduct courts can look to the effect of the conduct
on the landscape of innovation. In Microsoft III, the court focused on
112. Since the early days of monopolization analysis, conduct creating or maintaining
monopoly market share that could be characterized as "skill, foresight and industry" has
been a considered "natural monopoly," which is legal, and exempt from liability. See
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
113. Microsoft 11H, 253 F.3d at 54 (holding that "[n]othing in § 2 of the Sherman Act
limits its prohibition to actions taken against threats that are already well-developed
enough to serve as present substitutes").
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exclusionary licensing agreements and leverage of the operating
system in the browser market."4 Under the proposed framework,
those actions would be proscribed because of their effect on
competitors' ability to parlay innovative potential into deployed
solutions.
D. Challenges to Meet, and Pitfalls to Avoid
While making allowances for monopolists in innovative markets
with network effects may provide a more fine tuned analysis and
benefit consumers, a court must be sensitive to the challenges and
pitfalls that it presents. Identifying the innovative product market
participants and establishing market power may be extremely difficult
when many of the players are not prominent under traditional
analyses, which focus on market share. Further, there is potential for
real entrenchment in innovative markets, and the proposed
framework must be applied with caution to avoid simply becoming an
exemption from the antitrust laws for these types of markets. The
proposals made herein are not intended to give innovators carte
blanche, but rather to provide a more sophisticated analysis of the
effects of their behavior on the health of the market overall.
Even in a traditional market analysis, identifying the relevant
product market is a complex task."5 Brown Shoe provides what
appears to be a simple example: defining the relative product market
in a dispute among shoe retailers. The court nonetheless struggled
with the question of whether shoes formed the appropriate market;
whether men's, ladies, and children's shoes were each distinct
markets; and whether luxury shoes were distinct from economy
shoes."6 In a more complicated case, the Supreme Court dealt with
inter-industry competition, applying complex economic principles to
determine that glass container manufacturers were in active
competition with metal can manufacturers. 7
114. See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 34.
115. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (holding that the
"outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it").
116. Id. at 326 (holding that the further segmentation of the shoe market along
"price/quality" and "age/sex" lines would be unrealistic).
117. United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (1964) (pointing out that
"[i]nterchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand are not to be used to obscure
competition but to 'recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists' (quoting
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326)).
Similarly, identifying competitors in innovative markets may be
complicated and challenging. In determining what the potential
alternatives are, a court will need to engage in the same type of cross-
elasticity of demand analysis, only concentrating on products that are
not yet fully realized. In establishing market power, a court will need
to evaluate the condition of each competitive landscape it encounters,
as it did prior to allowing an inference of market power from market
share."8
Of greater concern is the risk that truly entrenched monopolists
would be able to evade liability for actions that in fact harm the
competitive landscape, thereby harming consumers. A large,
entrenched market leader can "set the standard" despite the
availability of other, superior standards."9 It is a justifiable concern
that the proposed analysis has the potential to leave monopolists in a
present product market in place, "locking in" their future position.2
In innovative markets, failure to detect and enjoin lock in conduct
early may irreparably harm the market, and its customers.'2'
As a threshold matter, it is important to acknowledge that not all
entrenchment leads to lock in, particularly when switching from one
system to another is cheap or easy.'22 Further, certain tactics in fast
moving markets that would be identified as anticompetitive elsewhere
may be appropriate, as in the case of aggressive pricing, where early
market penetration may be key to having any commercial viability at
all.2
The solution should focus the analysis of anticompetitive conduct
on that which creates long term entrenchment, adversely affecting the
ability of other firms to innovate and supplant the entrenched firm.
For example, in Microsoft III, the proposed framework could
establish that Microsoft's bundling of Internet Explorer with
Windows for free represented a concerted effort to prevent
middleware products from achieving their innovative potential.
12 4
After all, having defined the market as the landscape of innovation, it
is threats to the market's innovative capacity itself that should be
118. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
119. Shelanski & Shidak, supra note 32, at 9.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id. at 71 (arguing that "Microsoft mounted a deliberate assault upon
entrepreneurial efforts that, left to rise or fall on their own merits, could well have enabled
the introduction of competition into the market").
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enjoined. It may be a difficult process, as are many facets of antitrust
law, but in the end it will provide the greatest potential for serving the
needs of end consumers.
V. Conclusion
Antitrust law seeks to protect competition, rather than
competitors, for the purpose of providing the consuming public with
the best products at the lowest prices.'25 Certain types of markets
function in fundamentally different ways than others, necessitating
that it takes a different approach to regulating them so as to provide
the greatest benefit to consumers."' Product markets characterized by
rapid innovation and network effects provide the greatest benefit to
consumers when that innovation is fostered, and when those network
effects are protected.27 In innovative markets, courts should
recognize that the goal of the antitrust laws will be achieved when
competition for the field, rather than competition in a particular,
specific product market is protected. In applying old economy
antitrust principles to these markets, the law becomes a mechanism
for protecting competitors, rather than protecting consumers through
regulating the healthy function of the market itself.'28
The beneficiaries under the existing framework are firms who
seek only to provide an alternative source for a product already on
the market, rather than contributing their own ideas to the market.
This approach may have a chilling effect on innovation in these fields.
Fewer firms will feel the incentive to innovate themselves and would
wait for another firm to innovate, then free ride on the innovator by
developing a competing product.2 9 Further, to protect these providers
of alternatives is to chip away at the powerful network effects by
siphoning off a portion of the public to a secondary provider, rather
than encouraging them to stick together through the Schumpeterian
cycles of product development that naturally take place through time.
By changing the focus, the courts can provide more meaningful
protection for consumers by protecting competition through
125. See KINTNER, supra note 58, at 239.
126. See Schmalensee, supra note 16.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cf Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (recognizing that
manufacturer restrictions on "intrabrand" competition serve the competitive purpose of
creating incentive for "quality retailers" to make the investments in marketing, etc., that
are required for the manufacturer's product to effectively compete at the retail level with
other brands).
innovation. This model would provide incentive to make better
products, to continue to drive the state of the art, and to provide
solutions that bring consumers closer together, rather than further
apart. Congress has relied on the courts for over a hundred years to
create standards for enforcement of the antitrust laws, and to decline
to consider a new approach to competitive analysis in the face of a sea
change in competition is a travesty that leaves innovative industries
worse off.
To implement such a standard, courts should adopt a sensitivity
for the special needs of innovative markets for networked products in
three ways. In the market definition phase, courts should not exclude
potential alternatives and nascent competitors in order to best
understand the true field of competition. In discerning market power,
they should take into account a firm's share of the innovation in the
field, as well as aspects of its ability to control such innovation in the
future. Finally, when analyzing monopolization conduct, courts
should pay close attention to activities where a firm's intent or effect
is to inhibit innovation by others, or to secure ultimate control over
the pace, source, and expression of such innovations. Courts engaging
in monopolization analysis in new economy industries had better start
swimming, or they-along with the consuming public and the firms
whose antitrust challenges they attempt to resolve-may just sink like
stones, for the times they are a-changin'. 13
130. See BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia Records 1964).
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